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We report data from a prosopagnosic patient (PHD), and aged-matched control participants, from
experiments where participants categorised individually presented emotional faces (Experiment 1) and
Thatcherised (from typical) faces (Experiment 2). In Experiment 2 participants also discriminated
between simultaneously presented Thatcherised and typical faces. PHD was at chance categorising
Thatcherised from typical faces. He was, however, able to discriminate between Thatcherised and
typical faces, and partially able to categorise emotional faces. The results are discussed in terms of a loss
of conﬁgural processing but preserved feature processing in PHD. The loss of conﬁgural processing
impacts his categorisation of Thatcherised and typical faces, and his emotion processing, while his
preserved feature processing supports his ability to categorise some emotional faces and his ability to
discriminate between Thatcherised and typical faces.
& 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1. Discriminating Thatcherised from typical faces in a case
of prosopagnosia
The Thatcher illusion (Thompson, 1980) refers to the change in
perception of ‘‘Thatcherised’’ faces when they are rotated from
upright to inverted orientations. Thatcherised faces are made by
inverting the eyes and mouth. These faces appear grotesque when
upright but when inverted the grotesqueness disappears and
faces look more typical. There have been various accounts put
forward to explain the Thatcher illusion. These accounts range
from expression analysis (Valentine, 1988), to the phenomenolo-
gical experience of conﬂicting reference frames for faces and
facial features (Parks, Coss, & Coss, 1985). More recently, and
following Bartlett and Searcy (1993), the Thatcher illusion is
thought to reveal the orientation speciﬁc nature of conﬁgural
face processing. Perception of grotesqueness in the upright face is
attributed to the perception of unusual conﬁgural relationships
between the features, whilst perception of the typical inverted
face relies on feature based processing (Stu¨rzel & Spillmann,
2000). Furthermore, the automaticity with which grotesqueness
is experienced makes it a useful test of the presence of conﬁgural
face processing in atypical populations (Rouse, Donnelly, Hadwin,
& Brown, 2004) including congenital prosopagnosia (Carbon,
Gru¨ter, Weber, & Lueschow, 2007).
There are two (related) ways in which conﬁgural processing
(deﬁned here as the encoding of between-feature spatial.034
Mestry),
ton.ac.uk (T. Menneer),
BY license.relationships) might lead to the perception of the Thatcher
illusion. First, by a poor match between representations of
Thatcherised and prototypical faces. Second, by creating local
difﬁculties in conﬁgural processing for inverted eyes and mouths
which are in an unusual orientation relative to otherwise upright
faces. By the ﬁrst account, grotesqueness results from the fact that
individuals rate average and not distinctive faces as attractive
(Rhodes & Tremewan, 1996). By the second account, grotesque-
ness results from low processing ﬂuency associated with proces-
sing Thatcherised faces as faces (Reber, Winkielman, & Schwartz,
1998). Thatcherised faces are poor examples of the face category
and lead to a processing difﬁculty that is experienced as gro-
tesqueness rather than slow processing.
The involvement of emotional coding, in addition to conﬁgural
processing, in the Thatcher illusion is manifest in recent neuroi-
maging studies. Speciﬁcally, areas known to be involved in social
and emotional processing are also involved in the perception of
both single Thatcherised faces (Rothstein, Malach, Hadar, Graif, &
Hendler, 2001), and when discriminating Thatcherised from
typical faces (Donnelly et al., 2011). Therefore, despite being
thought of as an illusion demonstrating conﬁgural processing in
faces, and Thatcherised faces not representing standard emotional
faces, the phenomenology of the Thatcher illusion depends on the
response of diffuse socio-emotional cortices to Thatcherised faces.
The consequence of this fact is that any use of the Thatcher
illusion as a marker of conﬁgural processing should be accom-
panied by evidence of broadly intact emotional processing.
Otherwise any failure in perception of the Thatcher illusion might
result from deﬁcits in socio-emotional processing.
But what do we mean by broadly intact emotional processing
in the context of a deﬁcit in conﬁgural processing? The issue is
Table 1
Performance of PHD across a range of cognitive assessments.
Task Score
WAIS IIIa
Verbal scale
Vocabulary 9
Similarities 9
Arithmetic 5
Digit span 10
Performance scale
Picture completion 6
Digit symbol coding 6
Block design 9
Matrix reasoning 10
Camden memory testsb
Faces 12/25 (chance)
Words 21/25 (2nd percentile)
Scenes 20/30 (7–9th percentile)
Paired Associates 17/48 (o1st percentile)
Graded naming testc 8/30 (o1st percentile)
a Scores represent agerelated scores, M¼10, SD¼3, Wechsler
(1997);
b Warrington (1996);
c McKenna and Warrington (1983).
Fig. 1. Structural MRI taken from PHD showing a focal area of injury in the inferior
temporal lobe of the left hemisphere in the region of the fusiform gyrus.
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the perception of some facial emotions. For example, Calder,
Young, Keane, and Dean (2000) measured response times to
aligned and misaligned composite faces where the face compo-
sites are formed from the same or different emotions. By deter-
mining which emotions were responded to more quickly when
the top and bottom halves of faces were aligned relative to
misaligned, Calder et al. were able to determine which emotions
have their perception facilitated by conﬁgural processing. Table 1
of Calder et al. (2000) indicates the perception of anger, fear and
sadness from whole faces cannot be predicted from that of part
faces. In contrast, the perception of disgust, happiness and
surprise from whole faces can be predicted from that of part
faces. This means that the detection of anger, fear and sadness is
improved by computing conﬁgural information from whole faces.
The role of conﬁgurality in emotion processing was also
explored by McKelvie (1995). McKelvie compared categorisation
accuracy to emotional faces shown in upright and inverted orienta-
tions. Inversion led to less accurate categorisation of sadness, fear,
anger and disgust than when upright. Happiness, neutrality and
surprise were unaffected by orientation. Like Calder et al., McKelvie
suggested emotional expressions rely on conﬁgurality to different
degrees. Together these studies show conﬁgurality was important
in the perception of anger, fear and sadness. Only in respect of the
perception of disgust did the two studies differ.
What impact would the absence of conﬁgural processing have
on emotion perception in general and the Thatcher illusion in
particular? We propose that an absence of conﬁgural processing
should be manifest in (1) a speciﬁc pattern of modest deﬁcit in
the recognition of facial emotions that partially rely on conﬁgural
processing and (2) an inability to perceive Thatcherised faces.
In this study we report on a series of experiments conducted on a
brain-damaged patient with prosopagnosia. PHD has been
reported previously, in an ERP study comparing unfamiliar faces
and houses, and does not generate an N170 component in
response to faces (Eimer & McCarthy, 1999). If a failure to
generate a face effect at N170 is linked to a failure of conﬁgural
processing in faces through an absence of face categorisation (e.g.,
Eimer, 2000), we should predict two related ﬁndings. First, PHD
will be able to categorise facial emotion but only when this can be
done from features. Second, PHD will be unable to categorise
Thatcherised from typical faces.We start our exploration of PHD by testing his ability to
categorise facial emotions and to discriminate between faces
exhibiting different levels of emotion. We predict PHD’s categor-
isation of emotional faces will be impaired in those conditions
that rely on conﬁgural processing. Nevertheless, we also predict
PHD will have intact categorisation and discrimination of emo-
tions and emotional intensity when this can be achieved through
featural analysis. The goal of Experiment 1 is, therefore, to show
that PHD is able to perform categorisation and discrimination of
faces with emotional valence in at least some conditions.
In Experiment 2, we go on to explore his ability to categorise
and discriminate Thatcherised from typical faces. His ability to
perform in these tasks is compared with that of controls.2. Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, the sensitivity of PHD and age-matched controls
participants to categorising emotions was measured. While we were
interested in PHD’s overall ability to categorise emotions, we were
also interested in his ability to do so when only two emotions are
possible. In this case, the task demands of categorization are the
same as when categorizing Thatcherised from typical faces.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
An individual with prosopagnosia (PHD) volunteered to participate in studies
regarding his deﬁcit. PHD is a left-handed male, who was aged 48 to 51 over the
course of the current experiments. He sustained a closed head injury as a result of a
road trafﬁc accident at the age of 17. Structural MRI in 2005 (Fig. 1) showed a
unilateral lesion in the ventral temporal lobe in the region of the fusiform gyrus on
the left with no other macroscopic areas of damage. PHD suffers signiﬁcant cognitive
deﬁcits including apperceptive prosopagnosia and some category speciﬁc visual
agnosia, especially for the living things domain (animals and fruit and vegetables).
He has persistent difﬁculties recognising people from their faces without context or
other supporting information. PHD has a mild deuteranomaly and corrected-to-
normal visual acuity with eye-glasses and his visual ﬁelds are full.
PHD’s most recent cognitive assessment showed him to be functioning at an
average level on most subtests of the WAIS-III (Wechsler, 1997, Table 1). On the
Visual Object and Spatial Perception Test battery (VOSP, Warrington, & James,
1991) he scored within the normal range on Screening, Fragmented Letters, Object
Fig. 2. Examples for morphed face stimuli shown in Experiment 1. Angry, disgust,
fear and happiness (left to right). Percentage of emotion morphed with neutral:
10%, 50%, 90% (top to bottom).
N. Mestry et al. / Neuropsychologia 50 (2012) 3410–34183412Decision, Dot Counting, Position Discrimination, Cube Analysis and Number
Location. On the Warrington Recognition Memory Tests for Words and Faces
(Warrington, 1984), PHD’s recognition memory for words was above chance but
within the clinical range for his age. His recognition memory for faces was at
chance but he was within the normal range on the Camden test of memory for
Topographic Scenes (Warrington, 1996, Table 1). When confronted with portraits
of contemporary famous people, PHD was only able to identify the Queen and
President Obama. He indicated some familiarity with some of the faces (e.g.,
asking ‘‘is he an entertainer?’’ for Bruce Forsyth). If the most lenient criterion for
recognition is adopted, PHD scored 6/22 correct: a score below the poorest
achieved by patients attending a clinic for people with moderate levels of
Alzheimer’s disease (McCarthy, personal data).
The Benton Face Recognition Test (Benton, Sivan, Hamsher, Varney, & Spreen,
1994) was used to assess the status of face perception. PHD was able ﬁnd a single
face in the array of six that is identical to the target, scoring 6/6 on this ﬁrst part.
The remaining 16 items require matching for facial identity across viewpoints: the
participant must ﬁnd three examples of the target face amongst an array of six
items. PHD only succeeded on 30/48 choices, scoring within the severely impaired
range for the test as a whole. PHD’s score deteriorated further when the task was
presented in an inverted orientation (28). He tried to solve the puzzle of matching
the inverted faces by using an overt feature-naming strategy (‘‘have they got the
same eyebrows?’’ or ‘‘I can tell by the cheeks’’).
PHD’s ability to extract emotion cues from faces was initially evaluated
clinically using a paper based version of the Ekman 60 Faces Test, based on six
facial expressions generated by 10 different people from Ekman and Friesen
(1976) facial expression series (with stimuli kindly made available by Andy
Young). The stimuli were selected so that each emotional expression was as well
recognised as possible according to the Ekman and Friesen norms. They were
presented singly, in a pseudo-random sequence, with the labels ‘‘happiness, fear,
surprise, sadness, disgust, anger’’ printed underneath each face. PHD was asked
‘‘which word is closest to the emotion being experienced by the person in the
picture’’. A preliminary series of six expressions was presented (with feedback)
followed by 60 test faces, with 10 examples of each emotion, one posed by each
person. PHD’s total score was worse than that of a sample of 10 control
participants (age range 50–68) from the Cambridge subject panel (PHD scored
41/60). He was very impaired on fear, only recognising 2/10 examples (controls:
M¼8.6, SD¼1.17). PHD tended to misidentify fear as anger or surprise. He was
also signiﬁcantly impaired on sadness, scoring 6/10 (controls: M¼8.7, SD¼1.34)
suggesting disgust, anger and fear as possible options. In the case of anger, he was
within one standard deviation of controls, scoring 7 (controls: M¼7.7, SD¼1.42)
despite misidentiﬁcation of sad faces as angry. He was also within the range of
controls for disgust (PHD scored 9; controls: M¼9.0, SD¼1.25); for surprise (PHD
scored 8; controls: M¼8.5, SD¼1.58); and was not impaired at recognising
happiness (PHD scored 9; controls: M¼9.9, SD¼0.32). Despite typical perfor-
mance categorising angry faces, PHD was likely to mislabel other emotional faces
as angry.
PHD’s recognition of emotion was also assessed using body postures (kindly
provided by Beatrice de Gelder). He was asked to judge whether a posture was
happy, sad, angry or fearful. PHD was not as good as the controls reported by
De Gelder and Van den Stock (2011), but his score of 20/24 was well above chance.
PHD was also assessed on the TASIT (McDonald, Flanagan, Rollins, & Kinch,
2003): a series of video vignettes that have been designed to evaluate the ability to
extract emotional and social cues from short interactions. PHD performed well on
those items evaluating positive emotions (happiness, surprise and neutral items)
but was at or below the 5th percentile for the negative emotions of anger, anxiety/
fear and revulsion. More complex social interactions were mostly understood well.
See Eimer and McCarthy (1999) for further details of the abilities of PHD across a
variety of measures.
In Experiment 1, a control group of four age-matched, males (age range 31 to 63,
M¼52.25 years, SD¼14.41) were recruited. All participants had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision and were asked to complete the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory
(Oldﬁeld, 1971) prior to participation. Three were left-handed. No controls had any
history of neurological problems.
2.1.2. Stimuli
Grey-scale face morph stimuli were used from the Facial Expression of
Emotion test (Young, Perrett, Calder, Sprengelmeyer, & Ekman, 2002). Angry,
fearful, disgusted and happy faces morphed with neutral were shown (see Fig. 2).
The intensity of the emotion in the morph was varied creating a range of morphs
for each emotion with different intensities of emotion relative to neutral. All
morphs were based on two images of the same individual. Forty-ﬁve morphs were
used for each emotion: range 10–98% emotion at 2% intervals (180 morphs in
total). Each stimulus appeared at a size of 6.20 cm8.80 cm on the screen.
Therefore, the visual angle for each image was 7.1010.06 degrees, when viewed
on a desktop computer screen from a distance of 50 cm.
2.1.3. Procedure
Participants judged which of two possible emotions was being presented on
each trial in six separate blocks (paired combinations of happy, angry, disgustedand fearful). A ﬁxation cross was displayed for 300 ms followed by the stimulus
presented centrally on a black background until response. When each stimulus
face was removed it was replaced by a rectangle mask of monochrome Gaussian
noise displayed for 500 ms. Ninety trials were shown in each condition, with each
morph face being shown once. Participants responded by using the mouse buttons
in order to select one of the two emotion labels presented on the screen. Condition
order and the emotion assigned to each mouse button were counterbalanced for
controls and PHD. Controls each completed the task once and PHD completed the
task three times over a period of several months.2.2. Results
The data were aggregated into four intensity ranges: (10–30%;
32–52%; 54–74%; and 76–98%). These aggregated data were
converted into sensitivity (d0) and bias (c) scores. These data for
controls were analysed in two separate 6 (Emotion-pair)4
(Intensity) repeated measures ANOVAs. Separate ANOVAs being
performed for sensitivity and bias data.
For sensitivity (d0), there was a main effect of emotion-pairing
(F(5, 15)¼4.56, p¼0.010). Sensitivity was highest for the fear and
disgust comparison (M¼3.13, SE¼0.22) and lowest for the anger
and fear comparison (M¼2.11, SE¼0.36) but pairwise compar-
isons revealed there were no signiﬁcant differences in sensitivity
between the six emotion pairings. There was also a main effect of
intensity (F(3, 9)¼27.88, po0.001). Sensitivity improved linearly
from the 10–30% to the 54–74% intensity level (see Fig. 3) and
reached asymptote at this point with pairwise comparisons
revealing signiﬁcant differences between the 10–30% intensity
range and the three other intensity ranges (32–52%, p¼0.026; 54–
74%, p¼0.027; and 76–98%, p¼0.033), but not amongst any other
comparisons (ps40.517). The interaction of category and inten-
sity for sensitivity was not signiﬁcant (F(15, 45)¼1.10, p¼0.39).
There were no signiﬁcant effects of bias (Fso0.02, ps40.996).
PHD was compared to controls using Crawford and Howell’s
(1998) method which uses the control sample statistics as statistics
in the test rather than as parameters, which is more appropriate
when the control sample is modest in size. Bonferroni correction
Fig. 3. Sensitivity (d0) and bias (c) data for PHD and controls in all pair-wise categorisations in Experiment 1 with * to indicate signiﬁcance at p¼0.01 (two-tailed). (a) anger
and fear (b) anger and happiness (c) anger and disgust (d) fear and happiness (e) fear and disgust (f) happiness and disgust. Note, bias values are very small and therefore
appear absent in most ﬁgures (indicating no bias).
N. Mestry et al. / Neuropsychologia 50 (2012) 3410–3418 3413was used to correct for multiple comparisons. Signiﬁcant differences
at p¼0.01 are indicated in Fig. 3. These demonstrated that PHD
performed as controls except when discriminating fearful from
disgusted faces in the 54–74% and 76–98% ranges (t(3)¼184.88,
po0.001; t(3)¼111.50, po0.001), and angry from disgusted
faces (t(3)¼195.43, po0.001) and happy from angry faces(t(3)¼80.77, po0.001) in the 54–74% range where his d0 was
signiﬁcantly lower than for controls. Also for happy from angry
(t(3)¼29.16, po0.001) and happy from disgust faces (t(3)¼29.16,
po0.001) in the 76–98% range when his d0 was signiﬁcantly higher
than for controls. Note the values for c in Fig. 3 are very small
(indicating no bias).
Fig. 4. Percentage difference in emotion content required to discriminate magni-
tude of emotion for PHD and each control participant (P2-P5). Values for PHD
represent the mean difference across four repeats and therefore, include standard
error bars of the mean.
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The clinical data showed PHD to be poor at categorizing emotions
when recognising those emotions is facilitated by conﬁgural proces-
sing (i.e., fear and sadness, and in some respects angry if misidenti-
ﬁcation is considered). PHD’s impoverished categorisation of these
particular emotions may reﬂect an absence of conﬁgural processing.
However, these clinical data are difﬁcult to interpret. First, it is
possible that performance reﬂects a difﬁculty using such information
in the context of a six-alternative forced choice decision. Second, the
categorisations may be subject to criterion shifts, such as over-
estimating the relative frequency of some emotions, e.g., angry faces.
To overcome these issues we tested PHD in conditions where
the alternatives were limited to two and sensitivity could be
determined independently of bias. These data show that, given
sufﬁcient intensity, discriminating between pairs of emotions is
rather easy for control participants. More importantly, the data
show that PHD can make pair-wise categorisations of facial
emotions, especially if one of the face categories is happiness.
However, PHD is markedly less sensitive than controls when
categorising anger from disgust and fear from disgust, especially
at high levels of stimulus intensity.
By themselves, these data can be interpreted in a number of
different ways. We explored them further in a follow-up study:
PHD and controls performed a psychophysical intensity discrimi-
nation threshold task using the same face set as in Experiment 1.
We sought to establish the magnitude of the difference in
intensity between two faces of the same emotion that was
required before PHD and controls could reliably report faces of
the higher intensity. We reasoned that uncertainty in relation to
faces of speciﬁc emotions would translate into high discrimina-
tion thresholds (a higher percentage difference in emotion
required to make the discrimination). Using a one-up, two-
down threshold paradigm, we measured the point at which face
intensity could be reliably discriminated on 71% of occasions.
In this staircase paradigm, correct discrimination leads to a
reduced difference in emotion intensity between the stimuli on
the next trial, whilst incorrect discrimination leads to increased
difference. The threshold for reliably discriminating between
pairs of simultaneously presented angry, happy, fearful and
disgusted faces was measured. Again, Crawford and Howell’s
(1998) method for comparing a single participant to a small control
group with Bonferroni correction was used. The data show PHD to
be signiﬁcantly poorer than controls at within-emotion intensity
judgements of anger (t(3)¼9.22, p¼0.001) and disgust (t(3)¼
8.934, p¼0.001), but not of happiness (t(3)¼2.32, p¼0.103) or fear
(t(3)¼1.77, p¼0.174, see Fig. 4).
Together, the data from Experiment 1 suggest PHD to have
difﬁculties in the perception of anger and disgust, some difﬁculty
in the categorisation of anger from fear and no difﬁculty in the
perception or categorisation of happiness. This pattern of results
is consistent with a loss of conﬁgural information, where some
emotions will be more affected than others (McKelvie, 1995;
Calder et al., 2000).3. Experiment 2
In Experiment 2a, we explored categorisation of Thatcherised
from typical faces in PHD and controls. Using a task similar to that
used in Experiment 1, participants were asked to determine if
individually presented facial stimuli were Thatcherised or typical
faces. Given the salience of the Thatcher illusion for typical
participants we anticipated that controls would perform as if
discriminating between highly salient emotions. However, this
assumption needs to be stated more formally. We assume the d0sof Experiment 1 reﬂect the perceived difference in emotional
valence of face categories. We can match the d0s of controls when
categorising Thatcherised from typical faces with those from
Experiment 1 when categorising emotional faces. The critical
question is how PHD performs in the condition that has been
matched for valence. In particular, can his performance in Experi-
ment 2a be predicted from his performance in Experiment 1?
We also ran all participants in an additional study (Experiment
2b). In Experiment 2b, participants made ‘same’ and ‘different’
decisions to pairs of faces composed of orthogonal combinations
of Thatcherised and typical faces shown in Experiment 2a.
In addition to testing participants in Experiments 2a and 2b
with faces, we also tested participants using images of churches
that were manipulated (‘‘Thatcherised’’) in the same way as faces.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
PHD and eight left handed male controls were tested. Two
controls were age-matched (aged 54 and 56) and six were
students (age range 20–29, M¼23.17 years, SD¼3.66). All parti-
cipants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were asked
to complete the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldﬁeld, 1971)
prior to participation, all were left-handed. No controls had any
history of neurological problems.3.1.2. Stimuli
Ten grey-scale face stimuli from the NimStim face set
(Tottenham et al., 2009) were used to create Thatcherised stimuli
by inverting the eyes and mouths. Grayscale images of churches
were used as control stimuli and were manipulated in a similar
way to faces by inverting the windows and the door (see Fig. 5).
Individual face stimuli appeared at a size of 10 cm13 cm and
individual church stimuli at a width of 8.30 cm, although the
height varied between 7.59 cm and 16.98 cm. Therefore, the
Fig. 5. Examples for face and church stimuli shown in Experiment 2a (categorisation task) and Experiment 2b (discrimination task).
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between 5.79 and 12.92 degrees for churches, when viewed on a
desktop computer screen from a distance of 75 cm.3.1.3. Categorisation task (Experiment 2a)
Participants were instructed to decide if the stimulus (either a
church or a face) was ‘typical’ or ‘odd’. Odd was deﬁned by
explaining how they had been changed to look grotesque and by
showing examples of Thatcherised faces versus typical faces (and
the equivalent versions for churches). Stimuli were presented
centrally until a response was made. The experimental design
incorporated 10 individual faces, each in a Thatcherised and typical
form. Upright and inverted versions of each were repeated four
times, creating 160 trials. The same design was used for churches,
creating 160 church trials. The order of stimulus type was counter-
balanced across participants. Controls completed the task once and
PHD completed the task three times over a period of several months.3.1.4. Discrimination task (Experiment 2b)
Participants were instructed to decide whether pairs of stimuli
were ‘the same’ or ‘different’. Stimuli were displayed until a
response was made by pressing one of two designated mouse
buttons. The stimuli from the categorisation task were combined
into pairs and shown centrally, separated by a 2 cm gap for
simultaneous comparison. Equal numbers of matching and mis-
matching pairs were created using the same face/church identity
and orientation, with the only difference in a mismatched pair being
one stimulus was Thatcherised and one was typical. Each stimulus
appeared eight times in equal numbers of upright and inverted
presentations. There were a total of 160 face comparison trials and
160 church comparison trials. Trials were blocked by orientation
and object type, and block order was counterbalanced across
participants. Controls completed the task once and PHD completed
the task three times over a period of several months.3.2. Results
As in Experiment 1, all data were analysed in terms of signal
detection measures, sensitivity (d0) and bias (c). The age-matched
controls were always within the range of student controls and
therefore the data from all control participants was combined.
The results were analysed using 2 (Stimulus: Faces versus
churches)2 (Orientation: Upright versus inverted) repeated
measures ANOVAs. Separate analyses were computed for the
categorisation and discrimination tasks as well as for d0 and c.
The main effect of orientation was signiﬁcant for d0 sensitivity
in both the categorisation and discrimination tasks (F(1, 7)¼
57.64, po0.001; F(1, 7)¼11.02, p¼0.013, respectively). Partici-
pants were more sensitive to upright (M¼3.03, SE¼0.14;
M¼4.24, SE¼0.26) than inverted stimuli (M¼2.34, SE¼0.13;
M¼3.80, SE¼0.26). The main effect of stimulus type was sig-
niﬁcant in the categorisation task (F(1,7)¼6.34, p¼0.040) with
sensitivity higher to churches (M¼2.94, SE¼0.17) than to faces(M¼2.43, SE¼0.16). There was no signiﬁcant effect of stimulus
type in the discrimination task (F(1, 7)¼3.20, p¼0.117).
Orientation and stimulus type yielded a signiﬁcant interaction
in the categorisation task thus replicating many previous studies
of the Thatcher illusion (F(1, 7)¼13.55, p¼0.008). Inversion
reduced sensitivity to faces in the categorisation task (upright,
M¼3.15, SE¼0.16; inverted, M¼1.72, SE¼0.25), but there was no
difference for churches (upright, M¼2.92, SE¼0.15; inverted,
M¼2.95, SE¼0.20). There was no signiﬁcant interaction between
orientation and stimulus type in the discrimination task (F(1, 7)¼
4.41 p¼0.074).
With respect to the bias data, there was a main effect of stimulus
type on the categorisation task (F(1, 7)¼7.08, p¼0.032), with bias
towards the ‘odd’ response being greater for faces (M¼0.27,
SE¼0.09) than for churches (M¼0.02, SE¼0.09). There was no
main effect of stimulus type on bias in the discrimination task (F(1,
7)¼0.00, p¼0.999). The main effect of orientation was not signiﬁ-
cant in either the categorisation or the discrimination tasks (F(1,
7)¼4.09, p¼0.08; F(1, 7)¼0.82, p¼0.396). However, there was an
interaction between stimulus type and orientation in both the
categorisation and discrimination tasks (F(1, 7)¼16.30, p¼0.005;
F(1, 7)¼10.03, p¼0.016, respectively). Responses to faces were
more biased towards ‘odd’ and ‘different’ when inverted (M¼
0.60, SE¼0.16) than when upright (M¼0.07, SE¼0.08), whereas
the reverse was true with churches (upright, M¼0.08, SE¼0.09;
inverted, M¼0.04, SE¼0.14).
PHDwas compared against chance (d0 ¼0) and the pooled control
groups using one sample t-tests with Bonferroni correction. PHD
was above chance in all conditions of the discrimination task
(ts(2)49.76, pso0.010). In the categorisation task he was above
chance in the upright (t(2)¼15.05, p¼0.004) and inverted
(t(2)¼5.96, p¼0.027) church conditions but he was completely
unable to perform the face task scoring at chance for both the
upright (t(2)¼0.20, p¼0.858) and inverted (t(2)¼0.37, p¼0.746)
face conditions (see Fig. 6). When comparing PHD’s sensitivity to
controls (Crawford & Howell, 1998, with Bonferroni correction),
there were no signiﬁcant differences in any condition of the
discrimination task (magnitude of t(7)so1.42, ps40.198) or the
upright and inverted church conditions of the categorisation task
(t(7)¼1.03, p¼0.337; t(7)¼1.97, p¼0.090). However, PHD’s
inability to categorise faces was evident, with controls signiﬁcantly
more sensitive than PHD in the upright face condition of the
categorisation task (t(7)¼6.38, po0.001), and marginally more
signiﬁcant in the inverted condition (t(7)¼2.28, p¼0.056).3.3. Discussion
The categorisation task of Experiment 2a revealed that controls
showed, as expected, good sensitivity to upright and inverted faces
and churches. The sensitivity of controls to upright faces was
similar to the levels achieved when categorising highly intense
emotions in Experiment 1. Although equally sensitive when cate-
gorising upright faces and churches, controls were more sensitive
when categorising inverted churches than inverted faces.
Fig. 6. Sensitivity (d0) and bias (c) data for face (right) and church (left) conditions in Experiment 2a (top) and Experiment 2b (bottom).
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inverted faces but not churches, where his performance was
above chance and no different to controls. It might have been
that PHD was unable to perceive the stimulus alterations that
differentiated Thatcherised from typical faces. However, the
simultaneous discrimination task of Experiment 2b shows this
to not be the case. PHD was sensitive to differences in both faces
and churches, when both upright and inverted.
Comparing across discrimination and categorisation tasks, the
key contrast is that PHD cannot categorise Thatcherised from
typical faces, despite being able to discriminate the very same
faces when shown them simultaneously.4. General discussion
Controls were sensitive to categorising facial emotions,
discriminating intensity of emotional expressions, and categorising
and discriminating Thatcherised from typical faces. They also
demonstrated the expected inversion effect for faces when categor-
ising Thatcherised from typical faces.
PHD’s results differ from controls’ in important ways. First,
while PHD can perform pair-wise categorisations of emotional
expressions, providing emotions are sufﬁciently salient, he is poor
at judging relative intensity within some categories (anger and
disgust). Second, PHD is at chance categorising Thatcherised fromtypical faces, despite being able to discriminate differences
between these faces and being able to categorise churches.
We have hypothesized that this conjunction of ﬁndings is
consistent with an absence of conﬁgural face processing. There
are, however, two competing hypotheses. First, that Thatcherised
faces should be thought variants of angry faces (as suggested by a
reviewer) as PHD was impaired with angry faces in Experiment 1,
and he fails with Thatcherised faces in Experiment 2a. Second,
that the Thatcherised faces shown in Experiment 2 were less
intense in their perceived emotion than the emotional faces
shown in Experiment 1: if so, it might be that PHD’s failure in
Experiment 2 reﬂects a mere intensity effect.
With respect to the hypothesis that Thatcherised faces are
closely matched to angry faces, we asked PHD to categorise angry,
neutral and Thatcherised faces with a view to exploring the
resulting confusion matrix. PHD was not very good at this task
(78.13% correct on neutral trials, 58.13% on angry face trials and
62.50% correct on Thatcherised trials). More importantly, he
mistook Thatcherised faces as neutral faces (24.38%) more often
than as angry faces (13.13%). We conclude that PHD does not see
Thatcherised faces as angry faces and that his difﬁculties perceiv-
ing both classes of face, although related, are different.
With respect to the hypothesis that our Thatcherised faces
shown in Experiment 2 were less intense than the emotional faces
shown in Experiment 1, we can compare the salience of faces
across Experiments 1 and 2 directly. For controls, the sensitivity
(d0s) in Experiment 2 matched that of high and high-medium
Fig. 7. Graphs showing the regression of d0 against image similarity for PHD (left) and controls (right), using the d0 values from Experiment 1 and the upright face
conditions in experiment 2a.
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Thatcherised faces from typical faces cannot, therefore, result
from Thatcherised faces being of low intensity.
We conclude that these ﬁndings are consistent with PHD being
able to use facial features to map some emotional faces into
certain emotion categories. However, doing this requires being
able to compute the similarity of actual facial features to those
that deﬁne each category. At the limit, featural similarity can be
estimated in terms of the similarity of pixels across images in a
way that is not true for similarity determined by conﬁgural
relations. If PHD categorises faces (Thatcherised and emotional)
with reference to simple features then featural similarity between
the sets of images forming the categories should predict his
behavior in a way not true for controls.
We tested this idea by computing the similarity between
pairs of sets of images used in the categorisation tasks of
Experiments 1 and 2. The sets of images were determined by
the sets over which sensitivity was calculated. For the emotion
task, for example, sensitivity was calculated between the set of
low intensity (10% to 30%) happy faces and the set of low
intensity angry faces. There were 16 sets altogether (four emotion
ranges for four different emotions). For the Thatcher task, sensi-
tivity was computed between the set of typical faces and the set
of Thatcherised faces, providing two sets of images (typical and
Thatcherised). For each set of images, an average image was
created by taking the mean of RGB values for each pixel location
across all images in the set of faces. This average image formed a
single representation of all images in the corresponding set. The
difference between a pair of average images was then computed
by taking the difference in RGB values at each pixel location,
summing the squares of these differences, and taking the square
root of the sum to provide a measure of dissimilarity between the
pair. These dissimilarity measures therefore represented the
overall difference between two sets of images. These dissimilarity
data were then regressed against the mean sensitivity data for all
pair-wise categorisation decisions.
The results show that PHD’s sensitivity, across all categorisa-
tion conditions of Experiments 1 and 2, is predicted by this simple
feature similarity model (see Fig. 7). PHD was more sensitive tocategories when the images drawn from each category were
physically very different. His sensitivity reduces as the difference
between images reduces. The regression model was signiﬁcant,
F(1, 23)¼42.22, po0.001. Similarity is a signiﬁcant predictor of
sensitivity (b1¼0.17, t(23)¼6.50, po0.001, R2¼0.65).
In contrast, whilst the regression model is signiﬁcant for
controls (F(1, 23)¼12.77, p¼0.002 with similarity as a signiﬁcant
predictor of sensitivity, b1¼0.15, t(23)¼3.57, p¼0.002, R2¼0.38),
the data emphatically show that control participant’s responses to
Thatcherised faces are not based on simple feature similarity, as is
the case for PHD (see Fig. 7). Controls have an exquisite sensitivity
to the manipulations used to create Thatcherised faces.
These data suggest that, for controls, the categorization and
discrimination of Thatcherised from typical faces results from the
computation of some conﬁgural feature around eyes and mouths,
or from the difﬁculty of attempting to compute such features.
These two classes of explanation were raised in the Introduction.
Here we make one further point. The current data cannot
determine which of these accounts is correct. Other papers have
explored the nature of conﬁgurality in the Thatcher illusion
(Donnelly, Cornes, & Menneer, 2012; Mestry, Menneer, Wenger, &
Donnelly, in press). Moreover, the results suggest an absence of
conﬁgural processing in upright Thatcherised faces (Mestry et al., in
press). These data would suggest, therefore, that it is PHD’s absence
of conﬁgural processing in typical faces, alongside the general
absence of conﬁgural processing of Thatcherised faces, that leaves
him unable to categorise Thatcherised from typical faces.
This study has shown that discrimination of Thatcherised and
emotional faces is possible in a patient who lacks the N170.
However, the ability to categorise Thatcherised faces is lost.
A deﬁcit in conﬁgural processing impacts PHD’s categorisation
of Thatcherised faces and to some extent his emotion processing
while his preserved feature processing supports his ability to
categorise emotional faces and his ability to discriminate between
Thatcherised and typical faces. These results support the role of
conﬁgural processing in both perception of the Thatcher illusion
and typical emotion processing, but cannot speak to sources of
conﬁgurality being present in the upright Thatcherised face. The
Thatcher illusion is considered to be a face speciﬁc illusion where
N. Mestry et al. / Neuropsychologia 50 (2012) 3410–34183418conﬁgural processing is dependent on the automatic categorisa-
tion of faces (see Boutsen, Humphreys, Praamstra, & Warbrick,
2006; Milivojevic, Clapp, Johnson, & Croballis, 2003; Carbon,
Schweinberger, Kaufman, & Leder, 2005 for explorations of the
N170 in relation to Thatcher illusion). PHD does not show an
N170 face effect and does not experience the oddity of Thatch-
erised faces. Therefore, we suggest that the neural substrate for
automatic face categorisation, indexed by the N170, is a prere-
quisite for the experience of discomfort and oddity that charac-
terises neurotypical individual’s encounters with ‘‘Thatcherised’’
faces.Role of the funding source
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